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The paper discusses a perennial dichotomy of the human place in the universe related to its physical 
embodiment and, at the same time, to its epistemological infinitude. In different words, on the one hand 
humanity is physically incommensurable with the universe, on the other hand the whole universe is 
defined and articulated by man. It is claimed that modern cosmology is functioning in the conditions 
of the paradox of human subjectivity, which has been known since ancient Greek philosophy. The 
presence of this paradox explicates the essence of the human condition. Any attempt to represent the 
universe in the phenomenality of objects, that as devoid of the human insight, leads to the diminution 
of personhood and reduction of humanity to the artefacts of the physical and biological. However, even 
if cosmology advocates such a vision of the universe, personhood is not eliminated but is “present in 
absence”. Cosmology becomes an apophatic tool in explication of personhood as centre of disclosure 
and manifestation of the universe. Correspondingly cosmology exhibits itself as a characteristic middle 
between the natural and human sciences. 
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We know that man is closely allied with nature not only in the sense 
that he is part of it…but also, and even above all, in the sense that each 
impulse of his soul finds a profound an wholly natural substructure in the 
world, and in that way reveals to us a primordial quality of the structure 
of the universe. 
E. Minkowski, “Prose and Poetry”, p. 244
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Introduction:  
Cosmology in rubrics  
of Embodiment and Historicity
If cosmology, as a product of human activity, 
pretends to deal with the universe in its totality, 
assuming this totality in the natural attitude of 
mind as omni-spatiality and omni-temporality, 
it must exercise bravery in combination with a 
healthy scepticism of making pronouncements 
about the whole, by being only a tiny part of this 
whole. In spite of the fact that the philosophical 
mind, that is, a critical mind, accounts for its own 
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incomprehensibility of this totality on the grounds 
of the finitude of humanity, this finitude was at 
the same time counterweighted by its alleged 
infinitude. For example, Kant, when discussing 
the analytic of the sublime, took it as quintessence 
of human existence and asserted that as creatures 
dependent on the senses we are finite, while as 
creatures of reason we are capable of absolute 
freedom and independence. The universe can 
be paralleled with the sublime according to 
Kant’s definition that “the sublime is that in 
comparison with which everything is small”. 
Then, in his logic, nothing which can be an object 
of the senses can be considered as the sublime. 
However, and here Kant gives credit to humanity 
as capable of extending the realm of the senses: it 
is because “there is in our imagination a striving 
towards infinite progress, and in our reason a 
claim for absolute totality, regarded as the real 
idea, therefore this very inadequateness for that 
idea in our faculty for estimating the magnitude 
of things of the sense excites in us the feeling 
of the supersensible faculty” (Kant 1951 [§25], 
p.88). It is this supersensible faculty that makes 
it possible to produce the idea of the universe and 
thus to pretend for being commensurable with it. 
However, as was pointed out by J.-F. Lyotard, it is 
not in all cases that the sublime can be processed 
and integrated in the framework of experience. 
It can provide such an excess of sensibility and 
imagination that the finite human being cannot 
cope with it, and the origin of this Lyotard finds 
in the traumatic beginning of human life which 
in turn entails a radical, that is unmasterable 
finiteness of human beings (and thus, logically, 
their unmasterable incommensurability with the 
universe) (Lyotard 1997, p.243). 
Practicing cosmologists, however, dare to 
speculate about the universe as a whole postulate 
the contrary, that is that there is an intrinsic 
commensurability between their embodied 
intellectual abilities and the grand-total of being 
which this intellect attempts to encompass. Here 
they follow Pascal, who in his Pensées anticipated 
a simple truth that in spite of the fact that the 
universe in its deep foundations and origin is 
hidden from the human grasp, to know the nature 
of things humanity must assume its proportion to 
nature: “It is a strange thing that [men] want to 
understand the beginnings of things and from that 
to progress towards the knowledge of everything: 
for that is a presumption as infinite as the object 
of their exploration. We surely cannot make plans 
like that without an infinite presumption – or 
an infinite capacity – like nature itself” (Pascal 
1959, p. 73). For most of working cosmologists 
this commensurability is taken as a premise, for 
otherwise their work could not even begin. In the 
history of philosophy of mathematics one can 
find an interesting trend of relating the finitude 
of human beings as creators of mathematics with 
its very origin (Becker 1938). Mathematics is 
seen as the mastery of the infinite so that only 
finite beings can make sense of the problem of the 
infinite; only them want to master it and thereby 
find themselves “confronted by the abyss of the 
unsurveyable, innumerable, and undeniable” 
(Ströker 1965, p. 306). 
The commensurability between humanity 
and the universe, assessed by the philosophers 
of existence amounts to that “…the physicist 
continues to think of himself as an Absolute Mind 
before the pure object and to count also as truths 
in themselves the very statements that express the 
interdependence of the whole of the observable 
with a situated and incarnate physicist” (Merleau-
Ponty 1968), p.15). Thus cosmologists exhibit that 
mode of thinking, which can be characterised 
as an anonymous and collective rational core, 
striped of particular historical and personal 
incarnate situatedness in the world. Anonymous 
and collective nature of scientific thinking follows 
from the requirement that scientific knowledge 
and the method must be “public”, so that the 
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results of science can be presented to a wide 
audience and this ultimately establishes science 
as linked with episteme (as being different to 
personal opinions.) However the requirement 
of “publicness” of science allows one to pose a 
question of its subject or subjects. It is clear that 
in order to achieve a universal communication 
and public structure of knowledge one must strip 
off all historically contingent and empirically 
individual characteristics of subjects making 
them indifferent. In this case the truth established 
by one will be the same for another (Ibid., pp.16-
16). In other words, the commensurability 
between historical embodied consciousness and 
the totality of the universe is achieved by means 
of a radical reduction of all contingent properties 
of thinking (as related to situation in history and 
science pertaining to it) and equating the scope 
of consciousness’ receptacle to the totality of 
all articulated facts about the universe. Here the 
classical Cartesian constitution of the subject of 
knowledge is implied, namely the deprivation 
of this subject of any contingent characteristics 
makes this subject a-temporal and a-historical, 
attributing to its thinking capacity the qualities of 
absolute knowledge. The subject itself becomes 
universal and eternal so that it is here where the 
optimism of cosmologists lies: the knowledge of 
the universe is possible because of the universal 
and absolute nature of the subject of science. 
However, as it was pointed by Kant in the context 
of the notion of the world, this optimism can 
be justified only as related to “thinking of” or 
“imagining of” the universe, not knowing it. A 
careful consideration of the Cartesian constitution 
of the subject of knowledge, historically 
corrigible in view of Kant’s stance on it, tells us 
that this subject can only be achieved as a sort of 
eschatological reality, as an ideal which plays a 
regulative role with respect to particular scientific 
research. Then this implies that the representation 
of the universe as a whole as commensurable 
to scientific consciousness also represents an 
ideal, an asymptotic guideline which drives 
research which will never exhaust this ideal in 
every particular stage of it.1 Correspondingly, 
when cosmological consciousness forgets about 
a simple truth that its own facticity is related to 
embodiment in the physical which, as science 
itself demonstrates, is not immutable and hence 
contingent. Thus there arises a general problem 
of reconciling historical contingency of forms 
of embodied consciousness with the alleged 
apodictic nature of its judgements about the 
universe. 
Since cosmology pretends to deal with 
knowledge of the totality of the universe it is 
legitimate to pose a question about the human 
capacity for such knowledge. This in turn implies 
an enquiry into the human condition in general. 
One of the basic assumptions of the European 
intellectual tradition (in its deviation from the 
characteristically pre-modern Christian stance 
on anthropology) is that human nature, or human 
phenomenon, is part of the encompassing reality 
(that is, nature). The seeming efficacy of the 
methods of physics, for example, is transferred 
to anthropology and creates another conviction 
that one can exhaustively comprehend the 
meaning of human existence by methods of the 
natural sciences. What this means is that nature 
at large as well as human nature, as part of it, 
was implicitly conceived of as objects present-to-
consciousness. In this case the reality of nature, 
as the collection of things and objects given to 
this anonymously present consciousness in their 
sheer facticity, had to be apprehended by science 
and knowledge through revealing the essential, 
universal and common characteristics of these 
objects. Since human nature was considered as 
part of nature at large, it acquired the features of 
things (in the phenomenality of objects) within 
nature whose knowledge meant to know essential 
and shared physical and biological characteristics 
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of human beings which aim to define this very 
human nature although with a total disregard of 
personhood as the otherness to nature entailing 
existential uniqueness. 
The major difficulty with this naturalistic 
stance is that it predicates human nature as being 
part of and determined by nature at large while 
this very nature can be attained only from within 
its particular fragment, that is, human nature. 
It becomes clear that a philosophical ideal for 
radical enquiry about the knowledge of nature 
(or being) as devoid of any presuppositions about 
what has been sought can hardly be achieved 
because philosophy is created by human beings 
who cannot be removed from the central and 
initial point of any enquiry about nature (or 
being). Thus, it is understood that the question of 
nature and human beings in nature in particular, 
is most intimately connected with the question 
of how this being can be attained. Since it seems 
evident that the comprehension of being can only 
be reached from within the experience of what 
human beings themselves are, the attainment of 
nature (being) is always linked to that particular 
being which humans are. Thus if we refer to the 
universe as being a “part” or “mode” of being 
in general, one must admit that the being of the 
universe is always disclosed through the being of 
human beings. 
Speaking differently, a concrete human 
existence (as incarnate existence in situation) 
becomes the root and source of access to the 
universe. But what is so particular about human 
existence? What does this existence mean? 
Existential phenomenology assigns to the term 
“existence” a special meaning by affirming, for 
example, that this “term” serves not to express 
that something actually belongs to the realm 
of existing realities, but to indicate that mode 
of being which is proper to man and precisely 
constitutes him as human be-ing. Existence in 
this sense is only intrinsic to human beings, and it 
is this existence that makes them a fundamentally 
special mode of being. Thus the existence of the 
universe in this view can only be understood as 
the transferral of the mode of human existence to 
what we call the universe. In a different language, 
the universe is manifested or subsisting through 
articulation by human beings.2 
Existential phenomenology considers 
human existence as a primordial phenomenon, 
as an initial fact of any further philosophising 
about the world, which cannot be fully reduced 
to something else or demonstrated by reference 
to “the outside” of this existence. Theology in its 
“explanation” of the mystery of human existence 
asserts creaturehood of humanity, as the radical 
otherness to God serving at the same time the 
basis for the unity and hence objectivity of all 
hypostatic (personal) humanity. The existence 
of a particular human person is not something 
which is inherent or latently present in the world, 
but represents an event which is initiated in 
creation but which is not of creation. Christian 
anthropology argues that human subjectivity is 
inconceivable without embodiment, so that human 
existence is constituted by the unity of the body 
and soul. However, this unity is not an elementary 
fact of being-in-the-world, which can be easily 
taken as an initial point. In a Christian perspective 
the unity of body and soul is hypostatic, so that 
genuine existence is rooted in the mystery of 
the human hypostasis which transcends the 
world. This existence has its ultimate source 
in the transcendent Divine, in whom human 
soul and body inhere in their hypostatic unity. 
Christian anthropology asserts that human 
beings are constituted not only through their 
“natural” predisposition to transcend their own 
subjectivity in the world, but they also have some 
ability and will to transcend the very relationship 
between their subjectivity and the world, that 
is to transcend being-in-the-world3; this makes 
it possible to articulate nature in general (and 
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human nature in particular) not only through its 
relationship to human intentional consciousness, 
but to position nature with respect to God. In this 
logic it is through this other-worldly dimension 
that humanity can have ability to articulate 
the world as a whole by effectively positioning 
itself outside the world; human consciousness is 
commensurable with the entirety of the universe 
due to the similarity of their foundations in the 
other of the world. In this sense a universe of 
a human being would be always existentially 
co-present and unique to this being by the fact 
of creation, although its context as related to 
living experience would become completely 
contingent and probably incommunicable to the 
other. This would create a problem of articulation 
of the universe as totality within history, as 
communion in community of human beings. 
Christian theology responds to this by asserting 
cosmic history as part of the history of salvation 
(Clément 1976) thus exercising a move similar to 
that of existential phenomenology.
It is clear that the views of existential 
phenomenology, which in its methods mimics 
that which has been asserted in theology, are 
stated as radically different in comparison 
with the scientific natural attitude which treats 
humanity as thing among other things. According 
to existential phenomenology all particular 
manifestations and all meanings of things in 
the world can only be understood and receive 
their foundation as correlates of the human 
hypostatic subjectivity whose mystery itself is 
never exhausted by means the of physical.4 This 
implies that any scientific activity, including 
cosmology, cannot discard the tacit presence of 
human existence in their assertions of reality. Any 
attempt to speculate about the universe as if it is 
done in the name of anonymous and impersonal 
absolute consciousness becomes no more than 
a fallacious ambition of the human reason to 
produce syllogistic insights on the nature of 
the universe by disregarding the transcendental 
conditions of its presence in the world. This entails 
that cosmology with respect to its claims about 
the universe, cannot be consistently understood 
without taking into account the nature of human 
beings who create cosmology. As it was expressed 
elsewhere: “Man and the universe are like two 
parts of the same book which can be understood 
only by means of one another” (Dondeyne 1958, 
p. 10), (Köhler 2011, p. 37).
Subjectivity  
and Incarnate Existence
Existential phenomenology and existential 
tradition in general object to that stance of modern 
science which positions humanity as part of the 
outward reality (nature, world, universe) as if this 
reality existed independently of the constitution 
of this reality through human insight. Rather 
than beginning with nature and then seeing 
human life as its part, it argues for the reversal 
of procedure, that is seeing the human reality 
(as existential events) as the primary fact of any 
enquiry so that nature is to be seen in light of it. 
This implies that not only human reality cannot 
be a subordinate part of the natural universe, but 
the methods which are used to study the universe 
are not applicable to the phenomenon of humanity 
and human reality, because the latter is never an 
“object” present to itself, that is subjective reality 
can never be made an “object-thing” in spite of 
the fact that this subjectivity is always tacitly 
assumed in all modes of vaguely understood 
objectivity. Thus existential phenomenology 
insists that the ultimate meaning of the universe 
can be unfolded only by starting with human 
reality as separate and different in kind from the 
realm of the objectivised nature.5 
The existence of humanity is intimately 
connected with the interiority of its intentional 
consciousness. But the affirmation of this 
interiority as a definition of the physically real 
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human being leads naturally to the transcendence 
of the sphere of pure subjectivity through 
embodiment in order to become something special 
and concrete, that is to be placed in a particular 
space and time. Human beings find themselves 
already in the world, in a particular place and at 
a particular time, and it is through subjectivity 
they try to find understanding of their meaning 
which cannot be reached without transcending 
towards the world. This involves this subjectivity 
in a relationship with the world thus constituting 
the foundation of all meanings, associated with 
the articulation of the universe as a mode of this 
relationship which “produces the natural and 
antepredicative unity of the world and our life, 
being apparent in our desires, our evaluations 
and in the landscape we see, more clearly than 
in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text 
which our knowledge tries to translate into precise 
language” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. xx).
Existential phenomenology argues that 
the natural attitude with its opposition between 
subject and object must be overcome in order to 
discover the primordial field of the human being-
in-the-world, in which the actual contact with the 
thing “awakens within me a primordial knowledge 
of all things” and my finite and determinate 
perceptions’ become partial manifestations of 
a power of knowing which is coextensive with 
the world and unfolds it in full extent and depth” 
(Ibid., p. 430). By being completely encompassed 
and permeated by the world, there can not be 
anything in human beings which belongs to the 
world but does not belong to human beings.6 
The involvement of human beings in the 
world, the access to the world, and to its meanings, 
has its deepest ground in consciousness, which 
forms de facto the universal and sole medium of 
access. However, when one asserts the primacy 
of consciousness one means the perceptual 
consciousness which makes the contact with the 
reality which is not consciousness itself.7 This is 
the sphere of immediate sense-perceptions and 
meanings which forms the foundation which one 
needs in order to construct the world through a 
scientific thematization and conceptualisation. 
Consciousness being in an intricate link with the 
world does not represent itself entirely as an agency 
responsible for the constitution of the meaning; 
for, being responsible for the constitution of the 
meaning, it at the same time is perceptive of the 
meaning. Phenomenology doubts the legitimacy 
of any claim about existence of the ever-made 
pre-existent world without human beings; but it 
also denies the possibility that the meaning of 
the world, as given together with the meaning of 
man, can have its foundation outside the bundle 
of the world and man.
The sense of this “bundle” can be explicated 
through the terms: “dialogue” and “participation”. 
This view implies that science does not represent 
an objectivising description of the world on the 
side of an epistemological subject, which does 
not belong to the world and extracted from it. 
Cosmology, taken in its ontological meaning 
is an event of the universe itself. In this sense 
cosmology is limited by an ontological status 
of the participant of the world. Here is an 
interesting explication of what is meant by the 
dialogue between humanity and the universe 
and participation in the universe’s constitution. 
According to J. Kockelmans the meaning of 
the world arises in the encounter between man 
and the world and “exists only in an interplay 
of question and answer… Meaning arises in a 
dialectic relationship between man and the world, 
but it is not possible to say which of the two 
first begins the ‘interplay’ and which of the two 
first gives meaning to the other” (Kockelmans 
1966, p. 53). In similarity with this J. A. Wheeler 
asserted a dialogism in relation between man 
and nature: physical reality reveals itself as an 
evolving complex of meanings in the course of the 
interplay between questions and answers which 
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the human subject addresses to and receives from 
that “out there” which is articulated by human 
observers as the physical reality and nature. 
He writes: “Physics gives light and pressure-
tools to query and to communicate. Physics 
also gives chemistry and biology and, through 
them, observer-participators. They, by way of 
the devices they employ, the questions they ask, 
and the registrations they communicate…develop 
all they know or ever can know about the world” 
(Wheeler 1988, p. 5). The world is not a clock-
like machine which has been pre-constructed 
and then discovered by human observers; it is a 
self-synthesized system, coming into existence 
through the articulation of impersonal reality “out 
there” via questions and answers processed by a 
collective of persons-observers who are capable 
of establishing the meaning and interpretation of 
their observation-participancy which ultimately 
leads to the constitution of the integral view of 
nature. 
By defining human existence as being-in-
the-world, existential phenomenology asserts 
an inherent relationality between humanity and 
the world, the relationality which constitutes 
their ontology as relationship, not just simple 
epistemological coordination. Then “knowledge” 
can be treated as a special mode of this relationship. 
The world-pole of this relationship then appears 
only as its projection to human consciousness, 
that is things are presented to subjects as they 
“look” at them, but not what they are.8 Knowledge 
as a mode of relationship between humanity 
and the world can be described as a particular 
intentionality of the embodied consciousness 
towards the world, which treats this world as 
existing outside and independently of the sphere 
of subjectivity. This corresponds to the natural 
attitude which dissects the immediacy of being-
in-the-world, extracting from it only the mode of 
its explicit or visible “presence” to consciousness. 
However, the exercise of the natural attitude 
presupposes a kind of “pre-scientific” knowledge, 
as awareness of the surrounding “medium” in 
which human incarnate subjectivity functions, 
but which “shows” itself in its empirical absence.9 
This “pre-scientific” knowledge can be described 
in terms of in terms of incarnation: “To be 
incarnate means to appear to itself as body, that 
is this particular body...” (Marcel 1940, p. 31). Or, 
in different words: “Incarnation is the situation of 
a being who appears to himself to be, as it were, 
bound to a body.”10 In Marcel the ontological 
event when “existence comes into being” is 
linked to incarnation, which is a primary and 
incomprehensible mystery: all attempts to state 
what incarnation means are approximate and 
ultimately inadequate. Marcel calls the situation 
of incarnate existence a “concrete reality” which 
is neither exclusively physical nor psychical but 
which marks the limits of actions of an incarnate 
subject. 
The body, as individualised flesh in 
empirical space and time, plays a central role by 
co-ordinating the incarnate conscious self, with 
the rest of what this self treats as the objects of 
its intentional grasp. This co-ordination can be 
expressed in the language of consubstantiality 
of the human flesh with the material content of 
the universe: “To say that something exists is not 
only to say that it belongs to the same system 
as my body…, it is also to say that it is in some 
way united to me as my body is.”11 The sensible 
universe then represents the extension of the 
body of humanity in a very non-trivial sense: it 
manifests the ongoing incarnation of humanity.12 
Since incarnation, or “being in situation” cannot 
be objectified in terms of external constraints, 
the same is true with respect to space and time 
which, as part of one’s being in situation, come 
together with this situation. Space expresses 
here some characteristic of dynamics of life, 
being thus a relational “entity” with respect to 
that human agent who makes room for itself as 
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place and space. Making space constitutes a part 
of that creative development which accompanies 
any incarnation or being in situation, so that 
space acquires some specific forms of hypostatic 
expression of one’s being, providing thus forms of 
communication of different persons as different 
“beings in situation.” 
The co-ordination with the world is 
understood as an inherent consubstantiality, and 
it refers to what human beings share with each 
other and with the substance of the universe in 
a transcendental (not only empirical) sense. 
This means that the ‘matter’ and ‘nature’ have 
transcendental meaning as different expressions 
of that consubstantiality of the flesh with the 
whole universe. It is in this sense that one 
can argue that consubstantiality must not be 
understood only as sharing of nature and physical 
substance, but rather as a fundamental feature of 
humanity that relates itself to the universe. In this 
sense consubstantiality of flesh is related to the 
similarity in orders of creation. 
Incarnation in flesh reveals itself in space 
through a particular body but it is itself not of 
space: the incarnate consciousness manifests 
itself as non-local (that is transcending the 
boundaries of a body) and stretching across the 
universe thus carrying the whole world together 
with the body13; while being in a body it is not of 
the body, and this is the reason why it represents 
a typical situation when, in spite of its obvious 
personal presence as a body, the foundation 
of a sheer contingent facticity of this presence 
is unavailable to consciousness’s grasp. Thus 
incarnation cannot be phenomenalised even to 
the reflective consciousness of the incarnate 
person (no access to the mystery of one’s birth). 
This implies that every particular experience of 
the universe, as reflected and articulated through 
incarnation cannot be studied in the same way 
as the universe is studied in cosmology in the 
phenomenality of objects. In cosmology the 
collective and anonymous subjectivity creates a 
picture of the universe where a concrete human 
consciousness acquires the features of a contingent 
epiphenomenon of the physical by disregarding 
the centrality of the multihypostatic humanity 
humanity as being the centre of disclosure of 
the universe from within the human, Divine – 
oriented history. 
Humanity’s position  
in the universe  
and paradox of human subjectivity
In spite of simple philosophical truth 
that everything which is affirmed through 
observations and measurements receives its 
meaning and interpretation from within human 
subjectivity, modern science is still wrestling 
with the idea that reality, let us say physical 
reality, cannot be alienated completely from the 
acts of an apprehending intellect. Science pursues 
in many of its areas the methodology which is 
historically identified with the name of Descartes 
and which in which it attempts to establish an 
ideal of objectivity of its theories by making a 
split between subjective conditions of any human 
knowledge and the meaning of this knowledge 
which it tries to objectify. According to this 
view the object of knowledge is an objectively 
existing world, which is fully explainable and 
can be expressed in precisely formulated laws. 
The fundamental premise of the natural attitude 
of science, is that the world exists in itself in 
its entirety and possesses a rationality that can 
be fully understood. Scientism, as a radical 
implication of the natural attitude, follows a 
definite criteria of objectivity, based on the 
principles of quantity: whatever can be quantified 
and mathematised according to certain rules, 
is objective by definition. All those aspects of 
“reality” which cannot be quantifiable are not 
objective and therefore meaningless, whereas 
the subject of knowledge, is treated as pure 
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consciousness, which is fully transparent to itself 
and which faces the rational world objectively, 
that is, it grasps the universal aspects of reality 
(the world is reduced to our consciousness of it).14 
This ideal of knowledge was a certain reaction 
against embodiment and an attempt to free the 
knowing subject from body’s situatedness or 
localising entanglements. In view of some trends 
in contemporary philosophy of science this ideal 
of knowledge (which can be qualified as a sort of 
foundationalism) is arguable. It is enough to point 
towards research on transcendental appropriation 
of modern physics in order to realise that the very 
criteria for objectivity changed by taking into 
account the historical and instrumental context of 
science which brings with it the human factor.15 
This latter is ultimately linked to existential 
phenomenology’s stance on embodiment which 
avoids any lapsing in the foundationalism, 
because it positions its view on the cognising self 
as neither being grounded by the world nor being 
itself the ground of the world. 
In order to illustrate the point that knowledge 
in modern cosmology is imbued with human 
presence one may consider a simple example from 
popular scientific books which gives an account 
about the place of humanity in the overall structure 
of the universe. If one tries (in the natural attitude) 
to demonstrate the whole grandeur of the world in 
terms of typical sizes of objects, putting atoms, 
molecules, DNAs etc together with mega-objects 
like planets, stars, galaxies, clusters of galaxies 
and even the whole universe, then humanity finds 
itself in somewhat strange situation because the 
planet Earth inhabited by human life, occupies 
a tiny portion of volume of the visible universe; 
also the spatial scale of human body (102cm) is 
negligible in comparison with the radius of the 
visible universe (1028 cm). In a similar vein if 
the universe had a beginning 13.7 billion years 
ago, and then developed to its present state, it 
is not difficult to realize that the phenomenon 
of humanity came into existence at a very late 
stage in the history of the universe, so that the 
universe was devoid of human life (and hence 
devoid of self-expression) during the most part of 
its “history”. It is then not difficult to realize that 
if the human presence in the universe is judged 
from the point of view of its spatial and temporal 
dimension, human beings, considered as physico-
biological bodies, turn out to be a contingent and 
insignificant part of the universe.
The paradox which is present here arises 
when one realises that the very representation of 
the universe as a whole, including all different 
levels of its physical structure, and the very 
positioning of all objects in the universe against a 
spatial grid, is the product of human intellectual 
activity. The paradox is obvious: the finite, 
even insignificant embodied human agencies in 
the vast universe articulate the entire universe 
from a point-like position in space and time. 
Humanity actualises in knowledge the totality of 
the universe as its intentional correlate and this 
manifests a fundamentally non-local essence 
of human presence, being a quality and a mode 
of being which transcends the finitude of its 
corporeal place, as well as all particular objects 
and laws associated with this corporeity.
One can see that if cosmology positions 
humanity in the vast universe, assuming that the 
universe (as entity) is pre-existent (with respect 
to the human intelligence), then, humanity 
represents a particular type of “objects”, 
passively dependent on the universe. The so 
called “anthropic inference” in cosmology 
refines assertions about humanity’s position in 
the universe by recapitulating consubstantiality 
of the universe and humanity in quantitative 
terms pertaining to specific embodiment.16 In a 
way, this is a trivial observation which affirms 
self-consistency of the human knowledge of 
the universe with the physical conditions of 
embodiment which make knowledge possible. 
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However, the anthropic inference deals with the 
necessary conditions for physical and biological 
existence of humanity and does not cover the 
hypothetical realm of its sufficient conditions, 
related to humanity’s intellectual capacity. 17 In 
this sense the famous and simplistic characteristic 
of humanity as “microcosm” turns out to be 
fundamentally insufficient.18 The mystery of the 
sufficient conditions remains obscure in the same 
sense as the inability to account for the contingent 
facticity of all, including consciousness itself. 
In the natural attitude, where one attempts 
to explain the origin of consciousness as the 
epiphenomenon of the physical and biological 
one fails to recognise that it attempts to explain 
itself from itself. This fallacious logical circle 
originates in the fact that physics and biology 
operate in the framework of the already given 
consciousness but this very consciousness never 
becomes their subject matter.19 A. Gurwitsch 
comments on this accentuating the personal 
dimension of embodied consciousness: “what is 
decisive and crucial importance is not whether the 
existence of consciousness is conceded or denied 
but rather that, even if this existence is conceded, 
consciousness and whatever pertains to it are 
considered as “private” and thus not on principle 
subject to scientific investigation” (Gurwitsch 
1974, p. 133). It is because science cannot 
accommodate the dimension of personhood that 
it has to abandon the reference to embodiment 
at all and to treat consciousness as a medium of 
access which is hypostatically uniform and thus 
non-observable. Through such an oblivion human 
presence becomes irrelevant to the universe 
whereas sciences themselves become obscure. 
20 As it was eloquently put by Merleau-Ponty: 
“Scientific points of view, according to which 
my existence is a moment of the world’s are 
always both naïve and at the same time dishonest, 
because they take for granted, without explicitly 
mentioning, it, the other point of view, namely 
that of consciousness, through which from the 
outset of a world forms itself round me and begins 
to exist for me.”21 
The ambivalence in assessing of humanity’s 
position in the universe can be expressed in terms 
of a famous philosophical paradox asserting that 
while being in the universe, humanity is not of the 
universe that is, in a certain sense, it transcends 
the universe by “holding” it through humanity’s 
grasp. The dualism in human position in the world, 
which is present in this paradox, constitutes the 
inherent feature of any cosmological discourse 
which has to reconcile the locality and contingency 
of cosmic position of humanity with its abilities 
to transcend this locality and encompass in theory 
the universe as a whole. Any naturalistic attempt 
to suppress or subvert the essential ambiguity of 
consciousness of being in the world22 and, at the 
same time, of the whole world distorts a truly 
scientific interpretation of the universe. 
The abovementioned paradox was coined by 
E. Husserl as “the paradox of human subjectivity 
being a subject for the world and at the same time 
being an object in the world”. 23 However, in its 
essence it was known since ancient times, and 
Kant, for example, expressed it in his Critique of 
Practical Reason as the difference in appreciation 
of the things which fill the human mind with “the 
starry heavens above and the moral law within”: 
“The former begins from the place I occupy in 
the external world of sense, and enlarges my 
connection therein to an unbounded extent with 
worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, 
and moreover into limitless times of their 
periodic motion, its beginning and continuance. 
The second begins from my invisible self, my 
personality, and exhibits me in a world which has 
true infinity, but which is traceable only by the 
understanding, and with which I discern that I am 
not in a merely contingent but in a universal and 
necessary connection, as I am also thereby with 
all those visible worlds.”24 The paradox received 
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numerous formulations and interpretation (see 
(Carr 1999)) so that we provide the reader with 
a few clarifying references. M. Merleau-Ponty, 
rephrased the same paradox in the context of the 
tension between two descriptions of the human 
condition: “on the one hand man is a part of 
the world; on the other, he is the constituting 
consciousness of the world”; this tension is to 
be overcome on the ways of existentialism.25 E. 
Fromm, departing from a psychological dimension, 
gave to this paradox a status of “existential 
dichotomy” arising from the fact that, according 
to him, man emerged in being as “anomaly” and 
“the freak” of the universe, whose being in a 
state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium, 
anxiety, dissatisfaction and restlessness, which 
follow from being part of nature and transcending 
it.26 Similarly to Fromm, R. Ingarden describes 
the existential dichotomy as a very special and 
doubly-complexioned of man’s feeling of being, 
on the one hand, quite alien to everything that 
happens in nature independently of him, so that 
he sees himself deprived by it of any kindly help 
and almost loses trust in fate; on the other hand, 
“in his pure and autonomous essence he feels 
himself to be something that stands out above 
nature, something that is so much more dignified 
than purely physical processes or what transpires 
in animals, that he cannot feel in solidarity with 
nature and live fully happily by being united 
with it in its domain” (Ingarden 1983, p. 17-18). 
According to Fromm and Ingarden’s insights 
humanity, when it narrows it perception of the 
place in the universe to the status of a thing 
among other things, dooms itself to depression 
and anxiety of its own insignificance in the vast 
cosmos because life is enslaved and controlled 
by it. Contrary to this the cosmos acquires some 
inward meaning if humanity sees itself as the 
centre of its disclosure and manifestation. Then 
the universe receives intrinsic human qualities 
thus being united to humanity: the question then 
is not of being positioned in the universe, but 
that of living here and now in communion with 
the universe. But this communion means much 
more than sheer consubstantiality. It means that a 
human being can “transcend” the universe while 
retaining its immanence with the universe. As 
was emphatically asserted by M. Scheler: “Only 
man, because he is person, can rise above himself 
as a living being and make all to be its subject of 
knowledge, including himself, as if he would be 
a single centre on the other side of the space-time 
world. But this centre of human acts appropriating 
the world, its own body and its psyche cannot be 
itself a “part” of this world, that is, it cannot have 
any definite “where” and “when”; it can only be 
in the highest foundation of being. Thus man is 
a being which is above himself and the world.” 
(Scheler 1994, p. 160).
Hermann Weyl invoked this paradox as 
a riddle of the two-fold nature of ego, which, 
according to him, is beyond the limits of science: 
“On the one hand I am a real individual man, 
born by a mother and destined to die, carrying 
out real physical and psychical acts, one among 
many…On the other hand, I am ‘vision’ open to 
reason, a self-penetrating light immanent sense-
giving consciousness or, however you may call it, 
and as such unique. Therefore I can say to myself 
both: ‘I think, I am real and conditioned” as well 
as “I think and in my thinking I am free” (Weyl 
2009, p. 197). The paradox of human subjectivity 
reflects the fundamental existential dichotomy of 
the incarnate human condition as that primary 
reality from which any realistic cosmology 
and its philosophy must originate. And it is the 
inability of science to account for this paradox 
that leads inevitably to transcending tendencies to 
look for its foundation through the other-worldly 
connotations.27 
Such connotations were implicitly present 
in theology and religious philosophy. As an 
example, we provide few quotations from the 
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earlier Christian literature as well as from the 
20th century religious philosophy which explicate 
the sense of the paradox. Here is a passage from 
St. Gregory the Theologian (Naziansus) (dates) 
with a characteristic formulation of the paradox: 
“…Having decided to demonstrate this, the 
Artificier of the universe, the Logos, created man 
as a single living creature from both elements, 
that is to say from the nature of both the visible 
and the invisible worlds. On the one hand He took 
the body from already pre-existing matter, on the 
other He endowed it with breath from Himself, 
which Scripture terms the intelligent soul and 
the image of God (Gen. 1:27; 2:7). He sat man 
upon the earth as a second world, a great world 
in a little one, as a new kind of angel, adoring 
God with both aspects of his twofold being, fully 
initiated into the visible creation but only partially 
into the invisible, king of all that exists on earth 
but subject to the King above, both earthly 
and heavenly, both transient [by natureAN] 
and immortal [by the image AN], both visible 
[sensible by body AN] and invisible [intelligible 
by reason AN] , situated between greatness [lord 
of the universe AN] and lowliness [slave of the 
universe AN], at the same time both spirit and 
flesh…”28. In St. Maximus the Confessor (dates) 
the paradox was interpreted in the context of 
faith in God who created man in his own image 
and likeness, so that initially man was “like” 
God, that is he was “all in all”. C.f. (Col. 3:11). 
For example, Maximus the Confessor described 
this presence of man in all things in terms of a 
potential unity of all creation, which was to be 
realised by man as originally created: “…man 
was introduced last among existent things, as the 
natural bond mediating between the extremes of 
the whole through his own parts, and bringing 
into unity in his own person those things which 
are by nature far distant from each other…”29 
Man was created in order to mediate between all 
divisions in creation, for example between the 
sensible (visible) and intelligible (invisible); he 
writes: “As a compound of soul and body he [man] 
is limited essentially by intelligible and sensible 
realities, while at the same time he himself 
defines [articulates] these realities through his 
capacity to apprehend intellectually and perceive 
with his senses.” 30 For Maximus, however, the 
dichotomy, present in this affirmation was not a 
problem, for according to his theological position 
the fundamental non-locality which is present in 
human insight about the universe originates from 
the human ability (as God-given) to comprehend 
the intelligible realm which contains ideas about 
the universe as a whole. 
Another quotation is from a Russian 
religious philosopher N. Berdyaev: “There are in 
personality natural foundation principles which 
are linked with the cosmic cycle. But the personal 
in man is of different extraction and of different 
quality and it always denotes a break with natural 
necessity. ... Man as personality is not part of 
nature, he has within him the image of God. 
There is nature in man, but he is not nature. Man 
is a microcosm and therefore he is not part of the 
cosmos” (Berdyaev 1944, pp. 94-95)31; hence “the 
place of man in the natural world is tragic. Man 
is not only an object in this world, first of all he is 
subject which cannot be deduced from an object. 
Taken with this the relation of man to cosmos is 
defined by its being microcosm; he enfolds cosmos 
and history. Man cannot be a part of something, 
he is the whole. Through the spiritual in him, man 
is not subordinated to nature and independent of 
it although natural forces can kill him. If man 
would be just a natural and finite being, his death 
would not be so tragic: what is tragic is death of an 
immortal being who aspire to infinity. Only from 
an object-perspective man is part of nature; from 
a spiritual perspective, nature is in him. He is a 
slave of nature and he is its lord” (Berdyev 2003, 
p. 588). This can be paralleled with P. Florensky, 
according to whom “nature and man are both 
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infinite. And it is because of being infinite, that 
they are commensurable and can be parts of each 
other…Man is in the world, but man is complex to 
the same extent as the world. The world is in man, 
but the world is also complex as man” (Florensky 
1994, p. 188); “Man is the recapitulation of the 
world, its summary; the world is the disclosure of 
man, its projection” (Ibid., p. 187). S. Bulgakov 
contributed to the same stream of thought: “On 
the one hand, man is potential all, the potential 
centre of the antropo-cosmos, which, although, 
not yet realised but is being realised, on the 
other hand man is the product of this world, of 
the empirical” (Bulgakov 1993, p. 160). Another 
Russian religious philosopher V. Nesmelov 
describes the human knower as both a living 
organism and a transcendental subject. According 
to Nesmelov man is a Person who asserts itself as 
a free agent of its own volitions and is called by 
Nesmelov as absolute and unconditional being 
because he knows through knowing himself. 
The human person represents that link, or pole 
of being, where the unconditional and conditional 
meet (Nesmelov 1905, pp. 64-65).32 
The implicit presence of the paradox in all 
scientific affirmations of the universe reflects 
the intrinsic split between the two different 
modes of intentionality. The self-awareness of 
its own transcendental nature happens when the 
intentionality has to deploy its means to cope 
with the constraints and pressures of the outer 
world (embodiment, for example). The more 
the universe attempts to crush human existence 
under the weight of astronomical facts, the 
more the egocentric intentionality prevails as a 
measure of resistance to it. The more the pressure 
of the outer world relaxes, the more the same 
intentionality relaxes and the transcendental 
“I” looses itself in the outer things. Thus the 
constraints of the constitution of the outer world 
which escape clear-cut definitions and visibility 
constitute the very intentionality to the extent 
that it cannot fully cope with these constraints 
(Vialatoux 1965, p. 34). Then one can see that the 
paradox of human subjectivity is not simply an 
epistemological conundrum, it reflects a genuine 
ambiguity or bipolarity of human beings, which 
must be balanced and existentially balanced (c.f. 
(Leprince-Ringuet 1973, p. 164). S. Frank made 
a valuable comment that any attempt to remove 
this ambiguity or explain it away leads to the 
distorted anthropology and hence cosmology:
Through his body and carnal life, and 
external layer of his mind determined by its 
connection with the body, man in himself forms 
part – a subordinate and insignificant part – of the 
objective world….Through his depths – through 
the kernel or root of his being, and in this sense 
through his true essence – he belongs to the 
transcendent primary reality….(Frank 19??, p. 
34). Man thus has a dual nature, and every theory 
of life which fails to account of both aspects of 
his being is bound to be inadequate (Ibid.). ..The 
structure of our being is complex and antinomic, 
and all artificial simplification distorts it (Ibid., 
p. 35).
The dichotomy between faith and reason by 
the virtue of its factual existence manifests and 
explicates the complex life of man as being split 
in its intentionalities between the mundane things 
of the world and their underlying foundation, 
including the foundation of the very consciousness 
which is responsible for the facticity of both, 
theology and science. 
Spatial and temporal expression  
of the paradox of human subjectivity 
The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
world can be understood in a different way. On 
the one hand, being inseparable from reality in 
virtue of its embodied intentional consciousness, 
human persons can exist only in the context 
of their immediate non-distance from reality 
(consubstantiality). On the other hand, being 
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a hypostatic formation (humanity is endowed 
with an ability to inhere the universe in its own 
subjectivity through the fusion of knowledge, 
to form the meaning and act in the universe as 
its self-consciousness and self-realization, or, 
theologically speaking, as its hypostasis33), that 
is being fundamentally different from other 
material things, human persons are “infinitely” 
ontologically distant from those other things 
(which makes it possible to neutralise object 
within the primary relationship with subject and 
transform it into one-sided submission34). The 
ability to distance themselves from outer things 
(even, in abstraction, from one’s own body), makes 
human persons equally positioned with respect 
to all objects in the universe, so that they can be 
articulated by human subjectivity as different 
and uniformly distant from it. Paradoxically, on 
the one hand, because of the infinite ontological 
distance from all things in the universe humanity 
is hypostatically commensurable (and thus 
equally close) with respect to all objects in the 
universe, including the universe as a whole, 
whereas on the other hand, being corporeally 
at non-distance from the universe, humanity is 
physically incommensurable with the universe. 
The paradox of human subjectivity can be 
formulated in terms of space, that is in terms of 
humanity’s topological position in the universe 
(this will make the paradox even more close to 
the paradox of space in the Incarnation35). The 
formulation of the paradox in terms of space is 
achieved through a metaphor of the container 
and of the contained: on the one hand by its 
physical and biological parameters humanity 
is contained in the universe, on the other hand 
the universe itself is “contained” by human 
subjectivity as its intentional correlate (that 
is enhypostatically). In this formulation the 
ontological centrality of humanity is contraposed 
to its cosmographic mediocrity (cosmological 
principle). The distinction between two worlds is 
accentuated here: the one which is affirmed by 
cosmology as existing whole and scientifically 
thematised in terms of elements and essences, 
and another one, associated with the immediate 
life of consciousness, the so called life-world, 
the medium of indwelling into which every 
human being is brought into existence. For every 
particular being their life-world, being “here 
and now”, is linked to the planet Earth and thus 
is geocentric. Earth is ontologically central in 
a spiritual sense (c.f. (Lossky 1997, p. 64)), in 
the sense of “wherefrom” manifestations and 
disclosure of the universe do originate. In spite of 
the fact that astronomy and cosmology deal with 
Earth as an object and ascribe to it a movement 
in space, both of them were produced by human 
beings on Earth, and it was here, on this planet, 
that scientific thought developed the definitions 
of motion, rest, space understood in a general 
objective sense. Cosmologists’ statements 
concerning the indifferent position of Earth in 
cosmic space (cosmological principle) receive 
their meaning from experiences acquired here, 
on the planet Earth. The here which is the place 
of this initial experience is not therefore a place 
in space, since it is itself a place of origin of a 
notion of space.36 In this sense the cosmological 
principle, as a philosophical hypothesis 
articulating the uniformity of space at large, 
enters into contradiction with the singular and 
unique “here” which is radically incomparable 
with any “there” thus predetermining the non-
homogeneous topology in any ideation about 
space at large. The nontrivial nature of this last 
comment follows from a phenomenological stance 
on space as not pre-existent objective out there 
originating from subject’s passive contemplation 
of it, but in terms of subject’s comportment “in” 
it. This, so called, attuned space becomes an 
initial instant and a medium of disclosure of that 
“objective” space through relation to which this 
subject is constituted as corporeal existence in the 
– 1073 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Humanity in the Universe: Between Embodied Incommensurability and Intentional Infinitude
universe. However this relationship is manifest of 
a paradox similar to that of the container and of 
the contained put in an interrogative form: how 
can one grasp the relationship of a particular 
being (subject) as if it “in” space when this being 
is essentially constituted by being ‘over against’, 
and hence beyond space?37
What is obvious, however is that the 
constitution of space, first of all of the attuned 
space is intertwined with and not detachable from 
the fundamental aspect of human embodiment or 
corporeity, where the latter manifests itself as a 
living being in relation to other beings and to the 
world, in whom this relation is announced and 
articulated in a way of its sense-reaction and its 
comportment, or its action in situation. In this 
sense the constitution of space in all its varieties 
(from attuned space to mathematical space of the 
universe) represents the modes of explication of 
embodiment or corporeity through which human 
beings interact with the world. Thus the lived 
body entails a kind of lived space which bears 
the character of self-givenness “in the flesh”. In 
other words the initial point of any discourse on 
corporeity and associated spatiality implies a kind 
of knowledge as presence “in person” or “in the 
flesh” as a mode of givenness of an object in its 
standing in front of the functioning corporeity.
In cosmology, by articulating the entirety of 
the universe human beings remain corporeal, so 
that their corporeality as relationship to all things 
contains in its facticity the very premise of being 
incommensurable physically and commensurable 
hypostatically to the totality which humanity 
attempts to reveal in cosmology. The attitude to 
this totality is two-fold: on the one hand humanity 
attunes to it through belonging to it; on the other 
hand, through a non-egocentric intentionality 
humanity positions itself as if it were beyond 
the universe, “looked” at this universe as an 
object and depict the latter as something being 
present over against “the flesh” and in person. 
However, since humanity cannot abandon its 
position of corporeal existence in situation on 
the planet Earth, all cosmological models contain 
the elements of this given embodiment even in 
those cases when they predicate the universe 
in trans-human or even non-human (the early 
universe or multiverse) terms. In other words, 
the commensurability with the universe, as the 
transferral of some human qualities to it, is not of 
space, but originates in space. 38 
And finally, a brief note on the temporal 
dimension of the paradox39. Despite science’s 
claims that intelligent humanity is an insignificant 
and accidental evolutionary artefact in the 
material universe40, philosophers object to this 
by pointing out that human consciousness cannot 
be explained in terms of cosmic factors as well 
as in terms of the evolutionary theories (both 
cosmological and biological) that themselves 
are mental creations. This brings a temporal 
dimension to the paradox by pointing out that any 
speculation about the world as it existed prior to 
emergence of conscious humanity is a dubious 
enterprise, for what is affirmed as existing in 
pre-historical time still has features of that 
consciousness which is limited by the conditions 
of embodiment at present.41 This implies that the 
very history of the universe, given through the 
display of its frozen past, has sense only through 
the historical consciousness of human beings.
If human history is treated only as an 
epiphenomenon or as a continuation of the natural 
history of the universe, then the emergence of 
the phenomenon of humanity in the late history 
of the universe is merely a contingent aspect of 
cosmic and biological evolution and thus has 
no philosophical meaning. Any question about 
mankind’s significance or insignificance has 
meaning only if the whole of natural history is 
seen through the “teleological eyes”, which are 
themselves not an integral part of the scientific 
attitude. If, on the contrary, human history is not 
– 1074 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Humanity in the Universe: Between Embodied Incommensurability and Intentional Infinitude
only distinguished from the natural history of the 
universe, but actually understood as incorporating 
natural history as the unfolding constitution of 
the world and humanity within human history, 
then human history ceases to be a part of cosmic 
determinism and acquires some features of a 
“trial”, an “event” (the “humankind-event”42) in 
which man’s intrinsic freedom and a dualistic 
standing in the universe are encapsulated.43 The 
centrality of humanity’s position in the universe 
(as a subject of history of this universe) thereby 
acquires some teleological connotations: the 
universe needs humanity in order to be explored 
and thus transfigured (through knowledge) 
through the acquisition of the sense contrary to 
its seeming non-sensical contingent facticity. 
This point gives another dimension to the stance 
of phenomenological philosophy that the world 
is radically human in a non-trivial sense: “if 
man is attached to the world, the world likewise 
is attached to man, in such a way that it is no 
longer possible to speak about a world-without-
man” (Luijpen 1960, p. 25). The world, being a 
container for humanity is contained by human 
person not through the power of physical forces 
(consubstantiality), but through the power of 
intellect, which makes humanity as conscious 
persons equally, that is, qualitatively distant 
from the world in its apprehending capacity to 
articulate the world. 
The paradox of human subjectivity  
and personhood
The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
universe can be further explicated as pointing 
towards the different positions human subjectivity 
can adopt with respect to ontology of being. On 
the one hand there is an explicit treatment of the 
world in terms of thinghood, that is, in terms 
of things pregiven in order to be recognised 
by thinking consciousness. In this sense the 
universe pre-exists as substance and the ultimate 
ontology of being is thought to be the ontology 
of this substance. Then the facticity of human 
beings in the universe is treated as the variation 
of this substance. In this case, humanity being a 
part of the universe experiences fear that the laws 
of the universe with their contingent, but fine-
tuned outcomes at some stage can remove the 
phenomenon of humankind from it. On the other 
hand there is a different intuition that things which 
are out there, objects and entities in the universe 
appear not as external and hostile environment 
but as the manifestation of the living presence of 
humanity in the universe which actually makes all 
these things beings. The making of the universe 
must not be understood as manufacturing things 
from some pre-given material, but rather as 
creating things in a rather different sense. To 
create in the sense of personhood means not 
to physically dominate the pregiven, but to 
create such an ontological situation where all 
so called things acquire the “presence” relevant 
to the totality of existence understood not in 
terms of substance but in terms of hypostasis 
(personhood). Humanity itself becomes present 
and manifest through transferring its hypostasis 
to being. This hypostasis is not something which 
‘pre-exists’ in substance or in nature, it is not an 
impersonal combination of the worldly elements 
or platonic forms, but the center and the ultimate 
beginning of all articulated existence.44 
The paradox of human subjectivity can thus 
be explicated as the tension between ontologies of 
being based either on substance or on hypostasis. 
For example, in modern physics and cosmology 
the grandeur of the world is understood through 
particles, fields, space-time, planets, galaxies, 
the whole universe, but, as we have pointed out 
above, there is no place for human subjectivity 
and personhood. The personal characteristics of 
those who create the physical picture of the world 
are remarkably missing from the very result of 
their activity. One can say that while being tacitly 
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present behind the works of its own creation, 
personhood as the source of this creativity, is 
absent from its own creation. The picture of the 
universe is the manifestation of personal presence 
in the universe, but persons who created this 
picture are not explicitly found in it.45 Cosmology 
in its outward expression creates such conditions 
for unconcealment of the universe which takes 
place at the expense of concealment of persons. 
Personhood is missing from the natural 
sciences because they approach human beings 
in the same way as they approach other things, 
that is in the phenomenality of objects: one 
needs to “mortify” human beings and reduce 
them either to “walking dust” or to impersonal 
physico-biological robots in order to affirm their 
presence by means of observation and rational 
induction. But personhood as existential events 
escapes scientific grasp by transcending either 
materialistic definitions or idealistic beliefs. 
Personhood manifests itself as that givenness 
which cannot be subjected to any constraints 
of matter or categories of the understanding. 
This is the reason why it is impossible to define 
personhood in the way one defines things. Things 
can be defined because they can be possessed 
and operated, but it is impossible to possess 
persons.46
However, in spite of all the insufficiency of 
science to deal with the problem of personhood, 
persons do not disappear but reveal themselves 
in a rather dramatic way. Since humanity as 
personhood is not content with the presence 
of beings in the world as they are given to it 
empirically and studied scientifically. As we 
pointed out in the Introduction humanity wants 
to recognise beings not so much according to 
their nature, but as results of free will. Thus by 
subjugating that truth which is gained on the 
grounds of the scientific to the desire for truth of 
the whole created existence humanity exhibits 
its hypostatic essence, that is its personhood. 
Humanity as personhood prefers to express its 
own presence by appealing to the belief in the 
trans-worldly source of this existence in the 
conditions of its incapacity to overcome the 
absence of personhood in scientific articulations 
of the world. Humanity makes this effort as a 
resistance to being contained by the universe and 
being comprehended in the phenomenality of 
objects. It does not want to be manipulated through 
circumscribability and individualisation which 
are inherent in spatio-temporal representations of 
the universe. It is in this sense that humanity as 
personhood longs for truth of existence which is 
in this world but not of this world. This longing 
forms spiritual motives of humanity and points 
toward the telos of explanation of all, in which 
the paradox the human hypostatic existence 
as presence in absence will have to be finally 
resolved. 
The reinstatement of personhood implies that 
one must turn to the foundations of the sciences, 
their origin in constitutive acts of subjectivity. The 
absence of personhood in the resulting scientific 
picture of the world must be subjected to the 
phenomenological scrutiny in order to recover 
back those intentionalities of human subjectivity 
which led to the development of the world-view 
in terms of efficient physical causality. We have 
here a kind of a phenomenological reversal in 
attitude to cosmology: to look at it not from the 
point of view of the content of its theories and 
their alleged reference to the physical world, 
not to enquire into the meaning of concepts, 
such as, for example, the universe as a whole, 
its origin etc., but, in fact, to use cosmology as 
a hermeneutical tool for understanding humanity 
itself, to use the human image of the universe as a 
kind of mirror through which human subjectivity 
and persons constitute themselves. It is through 
this shift in attitude that the sense of cosmology 
can be reversed: it can be seen as that activity 
of the human self, which through its outward 
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look establishes itself and brings out (according 
to its will) the absence of personhood in the 
mathematised science to its explicit philosophical 
presence. The phenomenological reversal to 
the noetic pole of cosmological research is thus 
dictated by the work of intentionality. Seen this 
way, cosmological research exhibits an interesting 
interplay between the elements of the natural and 
human sciences that we discuss below. 
The phenomenological reversal of such 
a construct as the universe as a whole (which 
served for the naturally oriented mind as the 
ultimate objective background of all facticity of 
life), reveals this construct as a certain structure 
of the incarnate transcendental subjectivity. If in 
the natural attitude science affirms the explicit 
presence of the universe at the expense of the 
absence of personhood, in the philosophical 
attitude the universe as an intentional correlate 
of human subjectivity does not possess qualities 
of “out there” that is not measured in terms of 
distance. It is not the “other” as object here 
or there, above or below, right of left, near or 
far. The universe in all its entirety is posed 
as existent in the human hypostasis, but since 
this entirety is not available to any empirical 
acquisition, this enhypostasisation manifests the 
universe’s presence in absence. This result is not 
surprising, for as human personhood escapes 
complete definitions by manifesting itself 
through “presence in absence”, the universe, 
being a mirror of the human reason through 
which humanity constitutes itself also escapes 
complete definitions thus acquiring a mode of 
“presence in absence”, that is a mode of personal 
“opposite” of dynamic ecstatic reference. 
When one articulates the universe in terms of 
measurements of distance one loses personhood; 
when one brings the universe to being a personal 
“opposite” of ecstatic reference one loses the 
sense of the universe as extended space and time. 
The universe can then be understood as a kind of 
otherness of personhood which is present in the 
event of person’s self-affirmation. 
The positioning of human beings in the 
universe in terms of extended space and time 
represents a mental abstraction from the living 
experience (personal ecstatic reference) as 
that context where human beings conceive 
themselves as unique forms of existence. There 
is an immediate living context common to all 
human beings which makes their life meaningful 
and valuable regardless of what scientific books 
write about human insignificance on a cosmic 
scale.47 But this living context, the life-world 
in the terminology of Husserl, is not taken into 
account by science (as an ingredient of its own 
constitution). This indicates that the scientific 
picture of the universe, and hence its assertions 
about the insignificant place of human 
beings (as physical bodies) in it, represent 
abstractions from the living experience. The 
abstraction of the universe as the measurable 
and extended distance manifests the ideal of 
classical rationality to objectify the meaning 
of things (events) by means of paralleling the 
immediate experience of these things through 
their intelligible image in an abstract “space”, 
which contains universal structures accessible 
to every consciousness. 
This implies mathematics as a language 
of description, that allows everyone to position 
a physical event (as an existential event) in the 
abstract mathematical space and time. Then one 
can realize that the “physical” reality, which is 
articulated by conscious beings in the intelligible 
world contains in itself non-empirical elements, 
rooted in the trans-empirical nature of human 
subjectivity. This implies that “nature” (or the 
universe), understood classically as something 
which is independent from acts of consciousness 
cannot function anymore as a logically consistent 
notion, for it involves human consciousness in its 
definition as constitution. This is, in fact, a new 
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saying of that which W. Heisenberg advocated long 
ago, namely that the natural sciences are created 
by men, and that the function of the sciences is 
to be a part of the interaction, or relationship 
between nature and human beings.48 This entails 
the conclusion that scientific reality is not only 
the realm of the outer world, but also the realm 
of consciousness’s work in scientific discourse. 
Reality becomes a relation, an encounter, a 
coexistence of oneself and the world, ordination 
of the world to one and opening of oneself to 
the world, at once oneself and that which is 
other than oneself.49 Correspondingly physical 
theories of the universe can be interesting not 
only for the sake of physics and cosmology per 
se. While studying physical nature we also study 
the relationship between us and nature, and as 
a result, we study human nature. Cosmology, 
being initially a natural scientific aspiration 
towards the whole universe, thus becomes the 
“cosmology” of the interior cosmos of the human 
mind. Cosmology becomes a science of the 
human affairs whereas the universe, as science 
portrays it, becomes a “mirror” of the human 
embodied soul, the vision of humanity inside out. 
By paraphrasing a passage from M. Merleau-
Ponty, one can suggest that scientific thinking 
of the universe, a thinking which looks on from 
above, and thinks of the universe as an object, 
must return to ‘there is’ which precedes it, that 
is to the site, the soil of the humanly produced 
and modified world, as it is in our lives and for 
our actual bodies which we call ours, this sentinel 
standing quietly at the command of our words and 
acts (Merleau-Ponty1993, pp. 122-23). The same 
can be reformulated differently.
Since from a phenomenological point of view 
the structures of the disclosure of embodiment 
are part of the same cognitive life that extends 
to things like the categories of thinking, the 
exact sciences, logic and mathematics, the very 
paradox of human subjectivity in the universe 
contributes towards the constitution of the person 
understood as a transcendental subjectivity 
that faces its own corporeality through the 
empirical structures of the world. In other 
words, the very constitution of corporeality as 
an intentional correlate of consciousness takes 
place through the positioning of conscious bodies 
in the background of all cosmic things. But this 
implies that cosmology, as a special physico-
mathematical thematisation of this corporeal 
background, contributes indirectly towards the 
problem of the hypostatic corporeality, that is 
“to the site, the soil of the humanly produced and 
modified world” as that personal “opposite” of 
dynamic ecstatic reference. Here we come to a 
threshold in our discussion of the meaning of the 
human dimension in cosmology by formulating a 
thesis that cosmology is such a discipline where 
the demarcation between the elements of the 
natural and human sciences becomes very loose: 
cosmology functions at the crossroads of the 
natural and human sciences. 50
1 See an interesting discussion on the eschatological sense of the ideal of rationality in science in (Goutner, 2008).
2 One can employ a theological terminology by saying that the universe is enhypostasized by human being. The Greek 
terms enhypostatic or enhypostasis, which were introduced in theology by Leontius of Byzantium in the context of Chris-
tological discussions of 6 – 7 centuries, have meaning according to A Patristic Greek Lexicon as “being, existing in an 
hypostasis or Person”, “subsistent in, inherent”. Florovsky refers to the terms used by Leontius by saying that enhypostasis 
points towards something which is not self-contingent, but has its being in the other and is not contemplated as it is in itself. 
Enhypostasis is the reality in the other hypostasis. (See, for example, (Florovsky 1987, pp. 191-203). An example, which 
illustrates what the existence in a hypostasis or person means, can be borrowed from a sphere of theological anthropol-
ogy which asserts that “man is hypostasis [personality] of the cosmos, its conscious and personal self-expression; it is 
he who gives meaning to things and who has to transfigure them. For the universe, man is its hope to receive grace and 
to be united with God” (Gregorios,1987, p. 83). The universe as the expressed and articulated existence is possible only 
in human hypostasis, that is it acquires some qualities of existence if it is reflected in the personality of humanity. Using 
the words of Maximus the Confessor, every intellection about the universe inheres as a quality in an apprehending being 
(compare with his, Two Hundred Texts on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation of the Son of God , 2.3). The universe 
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thus acquires qualitative existence in the being who apprehends it. Prestige in order to illustrate how the apprehending 
knowledge becomes hypostatic existence refers to Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, 4:22, 136:4), in order to articulate 
the point that speaking of knowledge, “apprehension extends by means of study into permanent apprehension; and perma-
nent apprehension, by becoming, through continuous fusion, the substance of the knower and perpetual contemplation, 
remains a living hypostasis. This appears to mean that knowledge becomes so bound up with the being of the knowing 
subject, as to constitute a permanent entity” (Prestige 1955, p.176). The link between the universe as articulated existence 
and the apprehending being is not ontological, but rather hypostatic or personal. A Patristic theologian would say that 
existence of the universe as the articulated existence is hypostatic existence, that is the universe is enhypostatic.
3 This is terminology from (Heidegger 1998, p. 78).
4 In this sense phenomenology reproduces a Christian stance on anthropology as being apophatic because it tells one exactly 
what human person is not (see (Clément 2000, p. 30). 
5 C.f. Kant’s assertions on irreducibility of reason in Critique of Pure Reason, A553-557. 
6 This thought can be interpreted as consubstantiality between humanity and the universe. However it does not preclude hu-
manity from being incommensurable to the universe in terms of extended space and time. In a theological stance, however, 
this does not mean that human beings cannot have a mode of existence different from the physical world. In addition to 
this one must add that the term consubstantiality must be used with caution. The universe, as cosmology claims, consists 
of 96 percent of matter which ha no direct physical interactions with those atomic structures which constitute the visible 
universe and human bodies, in particular. However, one can speak in this case of consubstantiality with the universe in a 
transcendental sense: the invisible part of the universe are constituted through cosmological research as necessary cosmo-
logical elements for human existence. Thus the term consubstantiality reflects not only that link with the universe, which 
is empirically available, but has transcendental origin. 
7 In G. Marcel’s words: “My actual state of consciousness, which is bound up with the position of the organic body that it 
expresses, is the landmark in relation to which the infinite multiplicity of what can be thought by myself as existing is 
ordained. All existence can be traced back to this landmark, and outside of all relation to it, it is only by an abstraction 
that we can think existence. To think a thing as existing is to think oneself as the perceiver, it is to extend one’s experi-
ence in such a way that it comprehends even that which it appeared to leave outside itself. This does not imply the kind of 
subjective idealism which attributes a privileged value to the immediate date of perception, but only the affirmation that 
existence supposes a relation to an immediate thought in general, that is to say to my thought” (Marcel 1952, p. 14).
8 As was expressed by P. Florensky, “All that which is knowable by us is that which is grasped by us, and by us transformed 
into ourselves…Through the act of knowledge all becomes our likeness” (Florensky 1994, p. 184). Things appear to hu-
manity only within the context imposed by the very fact of its existence. In this sense the existence of things encodes the 
presence of humanity. By observing some things one can infer to the fact of existence of human beings. (Heidegger 1962, 
p. 88).
9 F. Nietzsche called this awareness “great reason of flesh” (c.f. ‘‘Von den Verächtern des Leibes,’’ Also Sprach Zarathustra: 
Ein Buch fu¨r Alle und Keinen (Nietzsche 1919)). Flesh does not mean the body, which, extended in the space of the world, 
is found there perceived or rather sensed, but it means my unique body, which alone senses the bodies of the world. It is my 
flesh that senses bodies that themselves do not sense: it senses everything else only by sensing itself sensing. E. Levinas 
calls a similar mode of awareness as “non-intentional consciousness” which “accompanies all intentional processes of 
consciousness and of myself who, within this consciousness, “acts” and “wishes”, and has “intentions”. This is awareness 
of consciousness , indirect and implicit, without an initiative to get back on myself, without aim; a passive consciousness 
as time which passes and makes me old without my involvement” ( Levinas 1998, p. 80). 
10 (Marcel 1965, p.16) (emphasis added). Marcel defines here existence in a way similar to that which was later used by E. 
Levinas, who spoke of hypostasis as an ontological event wherein “the existent contracts its existing” (Levinas 1987, p. 
43). 
11 (Marcel 1965, p. 15). C.f. P. Florensky: “Bilogically, all that which surrounds us is our body, the extension of our body, the 
aggregate of our complimentary organs” (Florensky 1994, p. 184). W. Heisenberg expressed a similar thought by assigning 
to technology the meaning of extended biological functions : “Technology no longer appears as the result of a conscious 
human effort to extend man’s material powers, but rather as a large-scale biological process in which man’s organic func-
tions are increasingly transferred to his environment.” (Heisenberg 1958, pp. 19-20). P. Heelan proposes the manifest 
image of nature as the totality of empirical horizons reached by human subjects through embodied intentions. In this case 
the body as subject is used by these intentions to extend itself into the environment and then to be adapted to any bodily 
extension (Heelan 1972, pp. 497-501).
12 (Marcel 1952, p. 259). Certainly this thought can be extended by saying that the past is not only related to my body as such. 
It is related to my conscious body which attempts to realise its past also in a strictly historical sense. To understand our 
past as history in general means to understand deeply and incorporate it in ourselves in order to become ourselves. One 
must attempt a breakthrough towards our past as origin from which all our present and future emerges. C.f. (Jaspers 1982, 
pp. 84, 117). 
13 This is a premise of commensurability between consciousness and the universe based in consubstantiality. 
14 One should remind to the reader that the natural attitude of exact sciences to what they called the “real” and “objective” 
stands in opposition to the philosophical attitude, which does not take for granted any presupposition of the given experi-
ence and anything pre-given as obviously existing. The latter considers it an error to assume that scientific knowledge is 
pure mirroring of the world-in-itself, as well as the very assumption that there can be established an access to the world-
in-itself in its absolute detachment from human senses and intelligibility. The overcoming of scientism and the natural 
attitude assumes thus that one cannot substitute the “objective” world of physical sciences for the fullness of experience 
of the living world by human conscious beings. 
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15 See more details in (Bitbol, Kerszberg, Petitot 2009). 
16 Literature on the “anthropic inference” in cosmology and associated fine-tuning is vast. See, for example, a classical book 
of (Barrow, Tipler 1986) as well as more recent (Barrow, Morris, Freeland, Harper 2008).
17 The sufficient conditions become actual in the present state of technology when humanity can control the factors of life’s 
existence on the planet Earth from the side of so to speak “negative conditions’: indeed it is in capacity to exterminate life 
on Earth so that the future continuation of life depends not only on the natural conditions and possible disasters which can 
terminate this life, but also on a conscious desire to have this life. This desire, however belongs to the sphere of the human 
morality and humanity’s vision of its own destiny and that is why is not entirely controlled by the physical factors. In this 
sense the sufficient conditions of existence of humanity in the universe depend on humanity’s own vision of its place in 
the universe, its importance or non-importance for the fate of the universe itself. Correspondingly cosmological research 
turns out to be important as contributing to the realisation of cosmic goals of humankind. (See discussion in (Nesteruk 
2003,pp. 195-208).
18 Being popular in Classical Greek philosophy, the idea of microcosm was criticised in Christian literature because it did not 
take into account the intellectual abilities to disclose the sense of the universe. Consubstantiality is triviality and, accord-
ing to Gregory of Nyssa, “there is nothing remarkable in Man’s being the image and likeness of the universe,...in thinking 
we exalt human nature by this grandiose name (microcosm, synthesis of the universe) we forget that we are thus favouring 
it with the qualities of gnats and mice. (Quoted in (Clément 2000, p. 34). Gregory’s comparison of humanity with mice is 
remarkable, because it is a very popular nowadays to advocate, on the grounds of biological evolution, that humanity did 
not progress too far from the animal-like state because humans and mice share 96 percent of their DNA. 
19 B. Carr comments on this situation in physics: “That physics has little to say about the place of man in the universe is per-
haps not surprising when one considers the fact that most physicists probably regard man, and more generally conscious-
ness, as being entirely irrelevant to the functioning of the universe”( Carr 1998, p. 152).
20 A. Gurwitsch described this state of affairs as inability of science to give an account of its own possibility and efficacy: 
“All questions concerning human reason …are eliminated from the sciences;.. if the human mind and human rational-
ity are either overlooked or explained away in a naturalistic fashion, the sciences themselves become unintelligible; …
the sciences appear as most ingenious technical devices which one may learn to use…but whose interior mechanism and 
functioning remain utterly obscure” (Gurwitsch, 1966, pp. 399-400).
21 (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. ix). Apart from inadequacy in comprehension of foundations of science the whole stream of thought 
can be supplemented by a spiritual sentiment, namely that separating the world and the universe from the conditions of 
functioning of human subjectivity, science based on the natural attitude, by using the words of the Russian philosopher 
S. Bulgakov, acquires lifeless intentionality and orientates us in the kingdom of dead things (Bulgakov 1993, p. 207). 
A French phenomenologist E. Minkowski expressed in a similar way that everything that science touches “becomes 
something immobile, dead nature” (Minkowski 1970, p. 246).
22 In words of A. Gurwitsch “[Consciousness’s] acts, on the one hand, depend functionally upon extra-consciousness facts 
and events, in this sense being effects of the latter, and, on the other hand, have presentational and cognitive function with 
regard to all mundane events and acts, including those upon which they depend causally” (Gurwitsch 2010, p. 160).
23 Husserl formulated this paradox as follows [mention that Husserl formulated this paradox in the context of analysis of 
science]: “Universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be 
nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world. How can a component part of the 
world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation…?” (Husserl 
1970, p. 179).
24 (Kant 1959, p. 260) (emphasis related to “infinity” has been added)). Kant’s usage of the adjective “infinite” has a two-
fold meaning here: on the one hand he speaks of the “true infinity” as that which is related to what things really are, not 
simply to their appearances. On the other hand, speaking of the “infinite elevation” he, de facto makes a statement of the 
incommensurability of human beings with all other natural things. The incommensurability, which is in different words 
can be described as the unbridgeable gulf between human person who articulate the things in the universe, and these very 
things which have no power of self-reflection and articulation at all. More than that the very notion of infinity as arising 
from freedom and inexhaustibility of the moral law is typically an human attribute in spite of a fundamental finitude of 
the human embodiment and the fact that it is because of this that anything which is received by us is conditioned, that is 
finite. (See more details in (Moore 1988).
25 “There are two classical views: one treats man as the result of the physical, physiological, and sociological influences 
which shape him from the outside and make him one thing among many; the other consists of recognizing an a-cosmic 
freedom in him, insofar as he is spirit and represents to himself the very causes which supposedly act upon him.” (Mer-
leau-Ponty 1982, pp. 71-72.) 
26 In Fromm’s words “He [man] is set apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all crea-
tures. Cast into the world at an accidental place and time, he is forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware of himself, 
he realises his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He visualises his own end: death. Never is he free from 
the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his 
body as long as he is alive…” (Fromm 1967, p. 40). 
27 The detailed discussion of the paradox of human subjectivity in a theological context can be found in (Nesteruk 2008, pp. 
178-84).
28 Oration 45, On Easter, 7 [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 203)].
29 Ambigua 41, PG 91, 1304-1312B [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 212)].
30 Ambigua 10:26, PG 91, 1153B [ET: (Palmer et al 1986, p. 277)].
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31 Berdyaev insists that the mystery of human personhood is related to its dual nature: on the one hand to its intrinsic 
natural (physical) necessity, and on the other hand to its ability to transcend the limits of this nature as being an image 
and likeness of the highest being, as a microcosm before whom stands the whole majesty of nature (Berdyaev 1944, p. 
81; 1989, pp. 294-96). Berdyaev blames the science of his time for not being able to realise the depth of the problem of 
humanity and, according to him, this is why one must ascend to religious philosophy, which is the only means that can 
handle the problem of man. Another representative of Russian religious philosophy and Orthodox theology, Fr. Sergei 
Bulgakov, also builds his attitude to science on the basis of a criticism of its fragmented description of reality and limited 
capacity of comprehending the world as living nature. The mathematical universe expels living subjects by converting it 
into the kingdom of shadows and “subjectless” objects: “science exercises the intentional murder of the world and nature, it 
studies the corpse of nature…” (Bulgakov 1993, p. 199). Bulgakov realises, just as Berdyaev did, the fundamental paradox 
of science: on the one hand science transforms the world into a lifeless mechanism, on the other hand, science itself was 
produced through the self-determination of the subject in the object (p. 205). The source of science, the foundation of its 
possibility, is to be found in humanity. Otherwise science becomes no more than an ingenious tool whose ultimate sense 
remains utterly obscure. Bulgakov anticipated this way of thought by formulating the thesis that to understand science one 
should turn to the understanding of man. It is not science that explains man, but man who explains science. Philosophy of 
science is a branch of philosophical anthropology (p. 188).
32 Nesmelov points to the vanity of all scientific attempts to “explain” personhood in its incarnate conditions. In its displayed 
givenness it can be studied, but the fact of its existence, as a real fact, can only be interpreted through the help of the Bible, 
in which the existence of man is posed as a fact of the relationship between God and the world. It is the mystery of the factic-
ity of the hypostatic being of persons that leads all philosophy and science to the idea of the free creation of persons by God, 
persons which sustain that mode of being from within which the disclosure and manifestation of the universe take place.
33 See the explication of this in (Nesteruk 2003), ch. 7.
34 See more in (Yannaras 2004, p. 114).
35 See on the topological paradox of incarnation (Torrance 1997); (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 226-36); also (Nesteruk 2013, pp. 323-
28).
36 This is theologically similar to what Christ as the Logos experiences with respect to the whole universe: the universe, 
being a spatial extension with respect to his human nature, is beyond space, that is not in space, with respect to his divine 
nature.
37 (Ströker 1965, p. 15). This reminds a Kantian stance on human being as being simultaneously phenomenon and noumenon: 
on the one hand space is an a-priori form of sensibility which allows a subject to order its experience; on the other hand this 
form of sensibility is unfolded not from within that space which is depicted by it, that is it comes from beyond any possible 
spatial presentation of experience.
38 For human beings to achieve the sense of commensurability with the universe one must be in space as a delimiter of 
their embodiment. Interestingly that this conclusion is similar to a Christian theological stance on space in the context 
of knowledge of God. It is because the incarnation of the Logos of God took place in rubrics of space and time, that no 
knowledge of God is possible outside the ways of Christ in space and time. (See, for example, (Torrance 1997)).
39 C.f. N. Berdyaev’s “Meditation on the eschatological metaphysics. Creativity and Objectification”, in (Berdyaev 2003, p. 
523). 
40 Some scientists, however, claim that the universe is intrinsically imbued with life, so that is outcome is not an accident. 
See, for example, in this respect (De Duve 1995); see also (Barrow et al. 2008).
41 The discussion of problems connected with the description of those eras which were not lived through by human 
consciousness can be found, for example, in (Aron 1938, pp. 39-46).
42 This is terminology from (Nesteruk 2003), ch. 7. C.f. (Morin 1982, p.120).
43 C.f. with the Orthodox cosmology’s claim that cosmic history is part of the history of salvation related to humanity, and 
not vice versa (see (Clément 1976, p. 80).
44 See more details on the explication of the meaning of “hypostasis” in (Nesteruk 2003), ch. 7.
45 In terms of a historical reference one can point to Erwin Schrödinger who in his work “Mind and Matter” empathically 
exposed a state of affairs in “the world of science” (contemporary to him) as “becoming so horribly objective as to leave 
no room for the mind and its immediate sensations” (Schrödinger 1992, p. 120). In the same paper he wrote: “Mind has 
erected the objective outside world of the natural philosopher out of its own stuff. Mind could not cope with this gigantic 
task otherwise than by the simplifying device of excluding itself – withdrawing from its conceptual creation. Hence the 
latter does not contain its creator”. (Ibid., p. 121, see also p. 122). To make his arguments stronger Schrödinger quotes 
similar passages from C. G. Jung (“The flood of external objects of cognisance has made the subject of all cognisance 
withdraw to the background, often to apparent non-existence”, p. 120) and C. Sherrington (“mind, the anything perception 
can compass, goes therefore in our spatial world more ghostly than a ghost….It remains without sensual confirmation and 
remains without it forever”, p. 121.) 
46 (Clément 2000, p. 30). Knowledge of persons is possible only through love, so that the Cartesian “Cogito ergo sum” must 
be replaced by “amo ergo sum”. G. Marcel, in a similar vein, develops an idea that love of a person precludes possession 
of this person in any possible sense (Marcel 1965). 
47 The articulation of insignificance of humanity in the universe plays a strange role in contributing towards the disappearance 
of existential function of modern science. The statement of this insignificance represents some scientific truth which is 
valuable for science itself. It does not affect at all a “man from the street” who “feels” in some manner that science literally 
“has nothing to say to him”. Consequently “man of science is incapable of telling him how to live, what is the significance 
of his job, what are those historical events which have grave consequence for his life.” (Strasser 1967, p. 211). It is in this 
sense science as activity does not affect the life-world as the sphere of existential events in their sheer facticity.
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48 (Heisenberg 1989, p. 69; 1958, p. 24) (emphasis added). 
49 (De Waelhens 1957, p. 168). C.f. J. A.Wheeler’s ideas on the dialogical character of study of the universe, when the result-
ing picture of reality appears as a cumulative result in the chain of questions to and responses from that which out there 
(see, for example (Wheeler 1994) and bibliography therein). 
50 See the detailed discussion of this thesis in my paper (Nesteruk, 2011).
References
Aron, R., 1. Introduction a la philosophie de l’histoire (Paris: Galimard, 1938).
Barrow, J., Tipler, F., 2. The Cosmological Anthropic Principle (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). 
 Barrow, J., Morris, S., Freeland, S., Harper, Ch., (Eds.) 3. Fitness of the Cosmos for Life. 
Biochemistry and Fine-Tuninng (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Becker, O., “Uber der sogenanten “Anthropologismus” in die Philosophie der Mathematik”, 4. 
Phil. Anz. Jg., III (1928), pp. 369-87.
Berdyaev, N., 5. Slavery and Freedom (London: Centenary, 1944). 
Berdyaev, N., 6. Truth and Revelation, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953). 
Berdyaev, N., 7. Philosophy of Freedom (Философия свободы), (Moscow: Pravda, 1989) (in 
Russian). 
Berdyaev, N., “Meditation on the eschatological metaphysics. Creativity and Objectification” 8. 
(Опыт эсхатологической метафизики. Творчество и Обектификация), in Spirit and Reality (Дух 
и реальность), (Moscow: AST, 2003), pp. 381-564 (in Russian). 
Berdyev, N., “The kingdom of spirit and the kingdom of Caesar” (Царство Духа и царство 9. 
кесаря), in Spirit and Reality (Дух и реальность) (Moscow: AST, 2003), pp. 565-671 (in Russian).
Bitbol, M., Kerszberg, P., Petitot, J., (eds.) 10. Constituting Objectivity. Transcendental 
Perspectives on Modern Physics (Springer, 2009). 
Bulgakov, S., 11. Philosophy of Economy (Философия хозяйства) (Moscow: Nauka, 1993) (in 
Russian)).
Carr, B., “On the Origin, Evolution and Purpose of the Physical Universe”, in 12. Modern 
Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. J. Leslie (New York: Prometheus, 1998), pp. 152-57.
 Carr, D., 13. Paradox of Subjectivity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Clement of Alexandria, 14. The Stromata, or Miscellanies, in A Roberts and J Donaldson (eds), 
The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1962).
Clément, O., 15. Le Christ Terre des Vivants. Essais Théologiques. Spiritualite Orientale, n. 17, 
(Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellfontaine, 1976).
Clément, O., 16. On Human Being: A Spiritual Anthropology (London: New City, 2000). 
Dondeyne, A., 17. Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University, 1958). 
De Duve, C., 18. Vital Dust. Life as a Cosmic Imperative (NY: Basic Books, 1995). 
De Waelhens, A., “Science, Phenomenology, Ontology”, 19. Cross Currents 17 (1957), 
pp. 157-64. 
Florensky, P., “Macrocosm and microcosm” (Макрокосм и микрокосм), in 20. Apology of the 
Cosmos (Оправдание космоса) (St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, 1994), pp. 
184-97 (in Russian). 
– 1082 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Humanity in the Universe: Between Embodied Incommensurability and Intentional Infinitude
Florovsky, G., 21. The Byzantine Fathers of the Six to Eight Century (FL, Vaduz: 
Büchevertriebsanstalt, 1987). 
Frank, S., 22. Reality and Man. An Essay in the Metaphysics of Human Nature (NY: Taplinger 
Publ. Comp., 1965). 
Fromm, E., 23. Man for Himself. An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1967). 
Goutner, G., “An eschatological aspect of ethics and epistemology”, ed. A. Grib, 24. Scientific 
and Theological Thinking of Ultimate Questions. Cosmology, creation, eschatology. (Moscow: St. 
Anderw’s Biblical Theological Institute, 2008), pp. 210-20 (in Russian).
Gregorios, P. M., 25. The Human Presence: Ecological Spirituality and the Age of the Spirit (NY: 
Amity House, 1987).
Gregory Nazianzus26. , Oration 45, On Easter, 7-9 [ET: in (Nellas 1997, pp. 203-205)].
Gregory of Nyssa, 27. On Making of Man, [ET: (Clément 2000, p. 34)].
Gurwitsch28. , A. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1966).
Gurwitsch, A., 29. Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974).
Gurwitsch, A., 30. The Field of Consciousness, in The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch, 
Volume III (Springer, 2010)).
Heelan, P., “Nature and its Transformations”, 31. Theological Studies, 1 (1972), pp. 486-502.
Heidegger, M., 32. Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
Heisenberg, W., 33. The Physicist’s Conception of Nature (London: Hutchinson Scientific and 
Technical, 1958). 
Heisenberg, W., 34. Physics and Philosophy (London, Penguin Books, 1989). 
Husserl, E., 35. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970).
Ingarden, R., 36. Man and Value (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983).
Jaspers, K., 37. Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung (Munchen: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 
1982). 
Köhler, H, “The Relation between Man and the World”, in 38. Astronomy and Civilisation in 
the New Enlightenment. Passions of the Skies, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, Analecta Husserliana, CVII 
(Springer, 2011), pp. 37-46.
Kant, I. 39. Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edition, tr. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933).
Kant, I., 40. Critique of Practical Reason, tr. T. K. Abbot (London: Longmans, 1959). 
Kant, I., 41. Critique of Judgement, tr. J. H. Bernard (NY: Hafner Press, 1951). 
Kockelmans, J., 42. Phenomenology and Physical Science (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1966).
Leprince-Ringuet, L., 43. Science et bonheur des hommes (Paris, Flammarion, 1973). 
Levinas, 44. Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987). 
Levinas, E., 45. Éthique comme philosophie première (Paris, Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1998). 
Lossky, V., 46. Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1997).
– 1083 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Humanity in the Universe: Between Embodied Incommensurability and Intentional Infinitude
Lyotard, J.-F., 47. Postmodern Fables, tr. G. Van Den Abbelle, (MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997).
Luijpen, W. A., 48. Existential Phenomenology ( Pittsburg, Duquesne University Press, 1960). 
Marcel, G., 49. Du Refus a l’invocation (Paris: Gallimard, 1940).
Marcel, G., 50. Metaphysical Journal (London: Rockliff, 1952).
Marcel, G., 51. Being and Having (London: Collins, 1965). 
Maximus the Confessor, 52. Cap. Theologicorum [ET: Two Hundred Texts on Theology and the 
Incarnate Dispensation of the Son of God, in (Palmer et.al 1986, pp. 114-63)]. 
Maximus the Confessor, 53. Ambigua 10 [ET: Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, 
and Virtue and Vice, in (Palmer et.al 1986, p. 277)].
Maximus the Confessor, 54. Ambigua 41 [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 212)].
Merleau-Ponty, M., 55. Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1962).
Merleau-Ponty, M., 56. The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1968).
Merleau-Ponty, M., 57. Sense et Non-Sense (Evanston: Norhwestern University Press, 1982). 
Merleau-Ponty, M., “Eye and Mind”, in 58. The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader. Philosophy 
and Painting, ed. G. A. Johnson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 121-49.
Morin, E., 59. Science avec conscience (Paris: Fayard, 1982).
Minkowski, E., “Prose and Poetry (Astronomy and Cosmology)”. In 60. Phenomenology and the 
Natural Sciences, ed. T. J. Kiesel, J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 
pp. 239-47.
Moore, A. W., “Aspects of the Infinite in Kant”, 61. Mind XCII (1988), pp. 205-23.
Nellas, P., 62. Deification in Christ. Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997).
Nesmelov, V. I., 63. Science of man (Наука о человеке), (Kazan: Cental Printing House, 1905).
Nesmelov, V. I., 64. Faith and Knowldge from the point of view of gnosiology (Вера и знание с 
точки зрения гносеологии) (Kazan: Central Printing House, 1913).
Nietzsche, F., 65. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, vol. 11 of The CompleteWorks of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Macmillan, 1919). 
Nesteruk, A., 66. Light from the East (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003).
Nesteruk, A., 67. The Universe as Communion. Towards a Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Theology 
and Science (London: T&T Clark, 2008).
Nesteruk, A. V., “Cosmology at the Crossroads of Natural and Human Sciences: is Demarcation 68. 
Possible?” Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences. Part. 1, vol. 4, n. 4, 
2011, pp. 560-76, Part 2, vol. 4, n. 5, 2011, pp. 644 -66.
Nesteruk, A., “The Cosmos of the World and the Cosmos of the Church: St Maximus the Confessor, 69. 
Modern Cosmology and the Sense of the Universe”, in Knowing the Purpose of Creation Through the 
Resurrection, ed. Bishop Maxim (Vasiljevic) (Alhambra CA: Sebastian Press, 2013), pp. 297-333.
Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, Ph., Ware, K., 70. The Philokalia: St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain 
and St. Makarios of Corinth. The Philokalia: The Complete Text, vol. 2, (London: Faber, 1986). 
Pascal, B., 71. Pensées. Selections, tr. Ed. M. Jarret-Kerr (London: SCM, 1959).
Prestige, G. L., 72. God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1955). 
– 1084 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Humanity in the Universe: Between Embodied Incommensurability and Intentional Infinitude
Scheler, M., 73. Die Stellung Des Menschen im Kosmos, in The Collected Works (Moscow: 
Gnosis, 1994), (in German and Russian).
Ströker, E., 74. Investigations in Philosophy of Space (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1965). 
Schrödinger, E., 75. What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell with Mind and Matter 
& Autobiographical Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Strasser, S., 76. Phénoménologie et sciences de l’homme. Vers un nouvel esprit scientifique 
(Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1967).
Torrance, T. F., 77. Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997). 
Vialatoux, J., 78. L’intention philosophique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965).
Weyl, H., 79. Mind and Nature: Selected Writings on Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
Wheeler, J. A., 80. At Home in the Universe (NY: American Institute of Physics, 1994). 
Wheeler, J. A., “World as system self-synthesized by quantum networking”, 81. IBM Journal of 
Research and Development 32 (1988), pp. 4-13.
Yannaras, C., 82. Postmodern Metaphysics (Brookline, MS: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 
2004).
Человек во вселенной:  
между воплощенной несоизмеримостью  
и интенциональной бесконечностью
А.в. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг,
ПОРТСМУТ, РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В статье обсуждается вечная философская проблема двойственности положения человека 
во Вселенной: с одной стороны, человек, будучи воплощенным физически, конечен, с другой – 
эпистемологически он неограничен. Другими словами, физически человек несоизмерим со 
Вселенной, эпистемологически же он охватывает всю Вселенную. Современная космология 
функционирует в условиях этого парадокса, известного со времен классической греческой 
философии, и, таким образом, эксплицирует сущность амбивалентного человеческого 
состояния. Любая попытка представить Вселенную как целое в феноменальности объектов, 
то есть как лишенную присутствия человеческого взгляда на нее, приводит к отрицанию 
личностного существования и сведению феномена человека к незначительному физическому 
и биологическому артефакту. Однако даже если космология ратует за такое видение 
Вселенной, личность не исчезает из картины Вселенной, но становится «присутствующей 
в отсутствие»: личность как центр раскрытия и манифестации Вселенной эксплицируется 
в космологии апофатически. Соответственно космология позиционирует себя как 
познавательная активность, принадлежащая как области естественных, так и области 
гуманитарных наук. 
Ключевые слова: воплощение, вселенная, жизненный мир, интенциональность, личность, 
микрокосм, парадокс субъективности, природа, пространство-время. 
